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1 Introduction
Elections of representatives are the most 
widely spread worldwide practice making a core of 
social or political control and public management. 
An efficiency of this social mechanism is heavily 
influenced by several factors. Apparently, 
comprehensive and reciprocally directed political 
and social communications seem to be the most 
essential ones among other types. They must 
be based on distinct, objective and detailed 
knowledge of the political views of voters, and 
their social status, or self-esteem.
Obviously, voters elsewhere do not form a 
homogeneous body; they differ in a number of 
characteristics, including biological (say, gender 
difference), demographic, anthropological 
figures, as well as in social, political, etc. issues. 
This diversity is rather important when a choice 
of a political agent is made. Electoral behaviour is 
a set of phenomena determining the development 
of the intention to choose some specific political 
figure.
Russia is a huge country, from the point of 
view of geography; in addition, it is inhabited by 
a great number of ethnic groups with sounding 
difference in abundance. These groups differ 
in a number of issues, being at times polar in 
religion or social, linguistics, etc. values. Thus, 
an identification and careful description of the 
territories where the residents display relatively 
homogeneous electoral behaviour is very 
important, especially for Russia. Vice versa, one 
may derive a lot from study of the homologies in 
the electoral behaviour in geographically discrete 
sites, when studying the social and economic 
processes in the country.
Some remarks should be made on the 
territory expected to yield a homogeneous 
electoral behaviour. Firstly, there exists formal 
administrative structure in Russia: it consists of 
– 604 –
Michael G. Sadovsky and Ekaterina B. Loginova. On the Electoral Behaviour of Russians
83 regions with political, legal and administrative 
semblance to state system in the USA, department 
system in France, or land system in Germany. 
These regions differ drastically in size, population 
density, infrastructure level, etc. For example, the 
cities of Moscow and Saint-Petersburg make the 
regions themselves, with the number of dwellers 
of 18.4 and 3.7 billion residents respectively. 
Meanwhile, the geographic area of these entities 
is extremely small, in comparison to the area of 
other regions. On the contrary, the Krasnoyarsk 
Territory has slightly less than 2.95 billion 
residents, while the area is equal to 2 339 700 
square kilometers. What is more, this region is 
not the largest one in Russia.
Secondly, the elections are organized 
through administrative structure in Russia. 
General governance and control of the elections 
is carried out by the Central Electoral Committee; 
then each region has the Regional Election 
Committee managing the elections within the 
region. Each region is subdivided into a number 
of territories where elections are organized by 
the Territorial Election Committee (hereinafter 
referred to as TEC). The borders of each TEC are 
set in a manner to justify the number of voters 
inhabiting that region in comparison with other 
TECs. Finally, the “ground” level in electoral 
process is embodied by Site Election Committees 
(hereinafter referred to as SEC) which are just 
the polling stations; again, the borders of each 
SEC area are drawn to equalize to the maximum 
possible extent the number of voters inhabiting 
each specific site.
An identification of the clusters of territories 
with homogeneous (similar) electoral behaviour 
is important both for fundamental and applied 
studies. Indeed, the differences in electoral 
behaviour result in the methods and channels of 
the spread of propaganda or other political issues, 
with due respect to the specific peculiarities of 
the voters inhabiting a given site.
The fundamental value of such studies is 
based on deeper comprehension of structure of 
a society; besides this, such studies explicate the 
political patterns standing behind the observed 
electoral behaviour. Several theories of electoral 
behaviour are in the focus of attention (Zakharov, 
2008; Akhrimenko, 2007). A theory of rational 
vote, valency theory, cleavage theory and some 
others are among them. The latter explains the 
electoral choice through attribution of a person to 
some social group; such groups yield a cleavage. 
The cleavage may manifest itself in income, 
residence area (urban area vs. rural one), religion, 
etc. Also, these papers provide an attempt to 
classify the Russian voters through the analysis 
of VTsIOM (All-Russian Center for the Study of 
Public Opinion) pollings.
A thorough paper (Norris, 2004) shows the 
results of regression analysis over 34 countries; 
and the impact of “classical” cleavages (such 
as ethnic, linguistic, religious ones) on the 
political preferences of residents is proven, see 
also (Enyedi, 2005). The paper by K. Reif and 
H. Schmitt (1980) also supports these ideas and 
brings more evidences of the feasibility of the 
theory under consideration. Also, the impact of 
income differences and social class identification 
is also shown; some more up-to-date details on 
that point are comprehensively discussed in 
(Blais, 2006, Dean, Croft, 2009).
The geographic and social issues in electoral 
behaviour of Russian voters are discussed in 
(Zhidkin, 2002; Luzanov, 2007; Turovsky, 2003; 
Grishin, 2008). The basic difference results 
from the residence area: urban vs. rural one. 
Urbanization level together with the density of 
urban population leads to forming six clusters 
[4]: 1) rural TECs; 2) mixed TECs; 3) urbanized 
TECs; 4) urban TECs in small and average cities; 
5) urban TECs in larger cities, and 6) urban 
TECs in megacities. Some evidences and theories 
explaining the divergence of electoral behaviour 
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of voters are presented in (Blais, 2006; Fowler, 
2006; Scappini, 2006; Bowler, Hanneman, 
2006).
Here we present and analyze the differences 
in political behaviour expressed in polling 
stations’ attendance and electoral preferences 
observed during the elections run in December, 
2011, when the deputies for State Duma were 
elected.
2 Material and methods
We have analyzed the electoral behaviour 
of Russian voters at the TEC level. Russia has 
2717 TECs for the elections under consideration, 
and the number of TECs within a region strongly 
depends on the population density of that latter. 
The data to analyze the electoral behaviour were 
taken from the official website of the Central 
Electoral Committee. There have been analyzed 
the results of the State Duma elections held on 
December 4, 2011. Not discussing here all the 
issues of that electoral campaign, we deal only 
with the official data records.
The votes gathered by each party during 
the electoral race were calculated for each TEC, 
as it is stated by the official records; obviously, 
the sum of all the parts is equal to one. These 
pretreated data were used for the further analysis. 
To analyze the electoral behaviour two techniques 
have been used: the first is unsupervised K-mean 
classification and the latter is elastic mapping.
2.1 Unsupervised classification
Standard K-mean technique has been used to 
develop an unsupervised classification of TECs. 
The parts of votes gathered by each party, which 
had taken part in the elections, were the variables. 
Let us now describe the procedure, in brief. At 
the starting point we separated randomly the 
set of TECs into N classes (we tried 2 ≤ N ≤ 6). 
Then the centroid for each class was determined; 
that latter was the arithmetic mean of the parts 
of ballots gathered by parties within the TEC in 
a given class. Next, for each point (namely, for 
each TEC) the distance to every centroid was 
calculated; we used Euclidian distance. A point 
remained in the same class, if it yielded the least 
distance to the centroid of the class; otherwise, a 
point (that is TEC) changed the class for another 
one, so that the centroid of that other class yielded 
the minimal (among all the centroids) distance. 
The class composition was upgraded, and then 
the procedure ran again. The cycle of the centroid 
determination and class upgrade runs while a 
point changes a class, due to the procedure. The 
procedure always stops for a rough data set.
The K-mean classification described 
above keeps the number of classes; thus, a 
distinguishability of the obtained classes 
should be checked out. The indistinguishable 
classes must be merged, and the procedure 
should run de novo. Yet, we checked no class 
distinguishability. Further details on K-mean 
unsupervised classification implementation could 
be found in (Gorban, Rossiev, 1996).
To verify the stability of the classification 
obtained through the implementation of 
unsupervised classification, we carried out a 
number of computations (i.e., classification 
implementations), in order to figure out the most 
proper number of classes for this one classification. 
It was found that the clusterization with three 
classes yielded the stability of 85  % in a series of 
the experiments, while the classification with two 
or four classes got significantly worse results.
2.2 Elastic map technique
Elastic map technique has been used to 
develop a nonlinear clusterization of TECs. This 
approach is a powerful tool of nonlinear statistical 
analysis. In short, it consists of the following 
steps:
Step 1. Determine the principal components 
of the original data set. Still, this is the 
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linear statistics treatment technique. The 
principal components are the directions 
of the greatest variability of the data. 
Mathematically, they are defined as 
the correlation matrix eigenvectors 
corresponding to the greatest eigenvalues. 
Two greatest ones must be defined;
Step 2. Expand a plane on these two eigenvectors, 
as on the axes. Then each point must be 
projected on the plane.
Step 3. Each data point must be bounded to the 
projection point with an elastic spring. 
Then, the originally rigid plane is allowed 
to be elastic, as well. Here are two basic 
parameters determining the procedure: 
the first is spring rigidity, and the latter 
is plane elasticity. The system is able 
to reach the minimum of the potential 
energy.
Step 4. Next, each data point is rearranged on the 
elastic map. The most proximal point on 
the surface must be found for each data 
set. These points represent the original 
data points.
Step 5. The elastic map is (nonlinearly) 
transformed into a plane, so that it 
looks like a rectangular grid. The data 
are represented in this nonlinearly 
transformed surface, and various types 
of cluster identification might be applied; 
an average local density of the points, for 
example. Here the parameter called the 
correlation radius is the key factor for 
efficient cluster pruning.
ViDaExpert software was used to do that; 
see details of the procedure and technique in 
(http://bioinfo-out.curie.fr/projects/vidaexpert/).
3 Results
Now we turn to the results in more 
detail. Paragraph 3.1 presents the results of 
implementation of unsupervised classification; 
Paragraph 3.2 shows the results of the 
clusterization due to elastic map technique.
3.1 Unsupervised classification
A stability of implemented K-mean 
clusterization is always doubtful from the point 
of view of the stability. Since an implementation 
takes start from a random distribution of points 
into N classes, then one may observe a significant 
lability of a great number of TECs between the 
classes. The situation is getting worse, when 
such redefinition of TECs shows no regularity, 
resulting in a random, completely disordered 
cluster composition.
A series of computational experiments 
let us conclude that a good clusterization is of 
three classes, whereas an implementation of a 
classification with two classes, or four (and more) 
exhibits significantly less stability. A part of the 
mobile TECs approached one.
Table 1 shows the distribution of TECs over 
three clusters. For each cluster the part of rural 
TECs vs. the urban ones is shown. It should be 
borne in mind that Table 1 shows the parts of 
urban vs. rural TECs in each cluster separately, 
but not the distribution portions of the territories 
between the clusters.
Fig. 1 and 2 show the TECs distribution in the 
space of parts of votes; each point is TEC. Fig. 1 
shows the distribution in principal components, 
while Fig. 2 shows the same distribution in natural 
coordinates (i.e., in parts of votes). Here the axes 
are the ratios of Fair Russia, Liberal Democrats 
and Patriots of Russia parties. Fig. 3 shows the 
distribution of TECs into three classes developed 
by K-means classification on the corresponding 
elastic map, in inner coordinates. A soft 16×16 
elastic map has been developed; here and further 
“soft” means a grade from the standard software 
options.
Geographic diversity of Russia results in 
a significant variation in a number of voters in 
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Table 1. The distribution of TECs in three clusters
Type of a settlement
Cluster I Cluster II Cluster III















Fig. 1. Distribution of TECs in the space of vote parts. 
Each point is TEC. Here the clusterization into three 
classes (identified in colour) is shown as developed 
through K-mean classification. Greater balls represent 
the class centroid; the ball size is proportional to 
the weight. The distribution is shown in principal 
components coordinates
Fig 2. Same distribution as in Fig. 1, shown in natural 
coordinates
a site to provide accessibility while going to the 
polling station on foot; obviously, a region of a 
large physical size together with the very low 
population density observed in it may have a 
decrease of the abundance of voters registered 
within the site of a given SEC (polling station). 
Similar pattern holds true for TECs.
A majority of the regions fall into the same 
cluster; in other words, TECs belonging to the 
same region occupy the same class, that is true 
for greater part of the regions. There are some 
regions, where TECs are split into two or three 
clusters. Thus, approximately 30 % of TECs for 
Tula Oblast, Bryansk Oblast and Arkhangelsk 
Oblast fall into the second cluster, while the 
majority of those regions occupy the first class. 
Similar situation is observed for the Krasnodar 
Territory and the Republic of Altai.
Analysis of geographical proximity of TECs 
from the second cluster reveals a group of TECs 
Fig 3. Same distribution as in Fig. 1, shown on elastic 
map (soft map, 16×16).
different TECs. Reciprocally, regions vary in 
number of TECs established within an entity. 
The point is that polling stations have to be 
located quite close to the voters registered within 
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Table 2. The regions with TECs spread between all three clusters. Both numbers (N) and percentage are shown
Regions
Cluster I Cluster II Cluster III
N  % N  % N  %
Mariy El 8 44,4 8 44,4 2 11,1
Voronezh oblast 18 46,2 15 38,5 6 15,4
Rostov oblast 34 54,8 20 32,3 8 12,9
Orel oblast 19 63,3 7 23,3 4 13,3
Ulyanovsk oblast 17 58,6 6 20,7 6 20,7
Table 3. TECs distribution in larger cities. Both numbers of TECs (N) and percentage are shown
City
Cluster I Cluster II Cluster III
N  % N  % N  %
Moscow 29 23,2 3 2,4 93 74,4
St. Petersburg 1 3,3 0 0 29 96,7
Novosibirsk 0 0 0 0 10 100
Yekaterinburg 0 0 0 0 7 100
Nizhny Novgorod 3 33,3 0 0 6 66,67
Samara 3 33,3 1 11,1 5 55,56
Omsk 0 0 0 0 5 100
Kazan 1 20,0 4 80,0 0 0
Chelyabinsk 4 40,0 0 0 6 60,0
Rostov/Don 3 42,9 0 0 4 57,1
Ufa 3 42,9 3 42,9 1 14,3
Volgograd 1 12,5 0 0 7 87,5
belonging to Tula Oblast and Bryansk Oblast 
situated close to each other. Moreover, they are 
close to some TECs from other regions (belonging 
to the first cluster). Similar situation is observed 
in the Republic of Altai, Saratov Oblast, Penza 
Oblast, Belgorod Oblast, the Republic of Adygea 
republic, and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, 
where TECs established in these regions are 
spread between the first and the second clusters; 
it should be noticed that the second cluster bears 
greater part of TECs (up to 60 %).
Probably, the most intriguing is the list 
of regions that are split into all three clusters 
(Table 2). The analysis of the “spatial conjunction” 
of different clusters within the same region shows 
that the second and the third clusters seem to be the 
most different in the light of electoral behaviour 
of their residents. It should be noticed that the 
city of Voronezh (member of the third cluster) is 
surrounded on all sides by TECs belonging to the 
second cluster (Novousmanskaya, Semilukskaya, 
Khokholskaya, Repyevskya, Ramonskaya, 
Paninskaya TECs, etc.). Rostov oblast exhibits 
pretty close pattern: the territories belonging to 
the third cluster are located at the southern end 
of oblast, while the territories from the second 
cluster are arranged into several dense groups.
Table 3 shows the distribution of TECs 
observed for larger cities. Here cluster II includes 
the minimal number of TECs from larger cities. 
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It is remarkable that two larger cities with mainly 
Islamic population are in the second cluster (Ufa 
and Kazan). Finally, that is the third cluster that 
grabs the larger cities: TECs located in the larger 
cities occupy this one cluster, as a rule. Again, 
two cities that are capitals of economically 
developed and relatively reach regions (Bashkiria 
with Ufa as a capital, and Tatarstan with Kazan as 
a capital) do not correspond to this pattern.
3.2 Elastic map clusterization
Fig. 4 shows the distribution of TECs in 
elastic map. The map parameters are indicated 
in the legend to the Figure. A number of clusters 
are evident in this Figure. The clusters differ 
in abundance of TECs belonging to a cluster. 
Thus, different clusters differ in their explication 
through the average local density. It should be 
mentioned that the number of clusters depends on 
the correlation radius r: if radius is large enough, 
then very few (maybe, a single one) cluster is 
identified. The number of clusters grows up, as 
r → 0. Ultimately, the number of clusters becomes 
equal to the number of the points, when r = 0. The 
choice of r value is a matter of expertise.
Let now consider the structure of the 
clusters shown in Fig. 4 in more detail. The most 
evident one is located in the left down corner of 
the map and includes TECs from seven regions: 
the Chechen Republic (completely), the Tyva 
Republic (5 TECs), the Republic of Tatarstan (23 
TECs), the Republic of Mordoviya (12 TECs), 
the Karachay-Cherkess Republic (3 TECs), the 
Republic of Dagestan (2 TECs) and a single TEC 
from the Republic of Bashkortostan. Obviously, 
the composition of this cluster exhibits a very 
good correlation to geography, religion and social 
characteristics of the regions grouped into this 
cluster. Similar situation is observed for other 
clusters, too.
The cluster which follows the previous one 
according to the average local density is located 
at the center of the map. It is rather diverse from 
the point of view of composition and includes 24 
regions. Actually, these regions seem to be rather 
typical for Russia, in spite of a wide geographical 
diversity. Indeed, the cluster includes a single TEC 
from Altai Krai and Zabaykalsky Krai, 5 TECs 
(of 74 total) from the Krasnoyarsk Territory, from 
one to three TECs located in Irkutsk, Kemerovo, 
Novosibirsk, Omsk and Tomsk Oblasts; 9 TECs 
representing the Udmurt Rebuplic, 7 from 
Stavropol Krai, 4 and 2 entities from Kurgan 
and Rostov Oblasts, respectively. The Jewish 
Autonomous Oblast, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous 
Okrug, Kaliningrad, Kaluga, Magadan, Ryazan, 
Sakhalin and Ulyanovsk Oblasts are present 
with a single TEC each in the cluster, as well as 
the Krasnodar Territory, Perm and Khabarovsk 
Krais do.
The third cluster ranked in local average 
density is located slightly higher the center of the 
map and consists of 19 TECs: 9 TECs belong to 
the Udmurt Republic, 5 TECs belong to Stavropol 
Krai, 4 TECs belong to the Krasnoyarsk Territory. 
Then, Amursk Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast and 
Fig.4. Clusterization of TECs with elastic map 
technique (soft map, 16 × 16); average local density 
of TECs is shown in grey scale. Green dots represent 
TECs from the regions called republic; red ones 
represent TECs from greater cities (like Moscow or 
Nizhny Novgorod), and blue ones represent TECs of 
the Krasnoyarsk Territory
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Kurgan Oblast are present with three TECs 
each, while Tomsk Oblast is represented with a 
couple of TECs. The Jewish Autonomous Oblast, 
Irkutsk Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, Kaluga 
Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, 
Rostov Oblast, Sakhalin and Tumen Oblasts are 
present with a single TEC each in that cluster; 
the same situation is observed for Khanty-Mansi 
Autonomous Okrug, Khabarovsk Krai and Perm 
Krai. It should be noted, that the level of support 
of United Russia was close to 50 – 60  % in all 
these regions.
The fourth cluster consists of 38 TECs and 
occupy the very center of the map and contains 
14 TECs from the Sakha (Yakutia) Republic, and 
8, 5, 3, 2 and 2 TECs from Volgograd Oblast, 
Voronezh Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Ulyanovsk 
Oblast and Tver Oblasts, respectively. Also, there 
are one TEC from Altai Krai, and one TEC 
from Rostov Oblast in the cluster. United Russia 
gathered here from 42  % to 64  % of votes.
Finally, the fifth cluster is the most abundant 
containing 55 TECs; it is located in the center 
of the upper part of the map. It has 13 and 6 
TECs from Altai Krai and the Krasnoyarsk 
Territory, respectively. Also, it has 10 TECs 
from Novosibirsk Oblast, 5 TECs from Orenburg 
Oblast, 3 TECs from Irkutsk Oblast, 2 TECs 
from Sakhalin Oblast, and a single TEC from 
Samara, Ryazan, Rostov, Omsk, Kurgan, Kirov 
and Ivanovo Oblasts each. The level of United 
Russia support was quite close to the average one 
observed over Russia entirely.
4 Discussion
K-mean classification explicitly identifies 
three classes covering the territories of the 
Russian Federation, with respect to the electoral 
behaviour of the residents of those territories. 
The composition of the classes is apparently non-
random. The territories composing a class possess 
similar characteristics in ethnicity, anthropology, 
culture, geography (to some extent), language, 
etc. The problem of the spatial vs. political and 
other social issues stratification in Russia was 
also discussed in (Wilson, 2005). While this 
paper focuses mainly on the á priori analysis of 
social, economical and cultural differences in the 
regions, we have taken quite an opposite approach; 
such approach seems to be less subjective and, 
furthermore, it proves the sounding correlation 
between electoral behaviour and social issues, 
not contrariwise.
An analysis of the class structure reveals 
quite intriguing fact that regions entitled with 
the word republic occupy the same class. This 
fact (the name of a region) seems to be the 
leading factor for class attribution. Surely, there 
are some exceptions from this pattern: say, the 
Republic of Karelia yields drastically different 
electoral behaviour. Obviously, the ethnic, 
social, language, cultural and other relevant 
features of the population of this republic 
manifest themselves in the electoral behaviour 
and affect the classification stronger that the 
legal status of republic. This fact resembles, to 
some extent, the situation in Ireland (Marsh, 
2006, 2007), where various groups of voters 
have been found, and this separation also 
correlates to social, economical and religious 
issues together with the geographical aspects. 
It should be said, that any analogy between the 
patterns observed elsewhere in Western Europe 
and in Russia must be carefully analyzed: the 
point is that the social mechanisms determining 
the electoral behaviour differ strongly for these 
two entities. Some more ideas concerning a 
feasibility of the cleavage theory to explain the 
electoral behaviour are discussed in (Enyedi, 
2005); further studies should be made to verify 
this theory in Russian conditions. Yet, all these 
papers analyze the electoral behaviour on the 
sociological background rather than the pure 
behaviour observations based on the voting 
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records. Also, some useful ideas may come from 
a comparative study of the electoral behaviour 
of French voters (Bèlanger et al., 2006).
Analysis of electoral behaviour with the 
help of elastic maps reveals significantly greater 
number of clusters; yet, the cluster identification 
here could not be completely formal. Correlation 
radius r is the key parameter for the cluster 
identification, while it could not be determined 
formally and is matter of taste of a researcher. 
We chose r = 0.05 that obviously reveals at least 
fifteen clusters, and two of them are extremely 
dense. The cluster composition is obviously non-
random. Yet, the structure of the clusters seems 
to be more complex, in comparison to the classes 
obtained through K-mean classification.
The most obvious fact is that the clusters 
are definitely quite complex from the point of 
view of the set of TECs composing them. This 
is neither mistake, nor discrepancy: since the 
elastic map technique is more sensitive and 
specific in clusterization, the clusters may 
include geographically discrete territories, if the 
electoral behaviour of the voters inhabiting these 
territories looks similar. Here the researcher has 
to be rather careful in understanding the reasons 
standing behind such cluster construction: 
whether the similitudes in economy, social and 
cultural issues really take place in these distant 
territories, or this is just an arbitrary coincidence 
of the voters’ choice resulted in the same cluster 
occupation, and such cases must be studied 
individually.
One of these two dense clusters enlists the 
republics of the Northern Caucasus and some 
other territories with mainly Islamic population. 
Residence area (a type of a settlement, to be 
exact) is another important factor of the split 
of voters into several patterns of electoral 
behaviour.
It should be stressed that larger cities, in 
turn, are not homogeneous, if to consider the 
electoral behaviour of the residents. Table 3 
shows the distribution of TECs of larger cities 
over three classes developed due to unsupervised 
classification. 
Evidently, these larger cities are separated 
into two groups: the first consists of the cities 
whose TECs occupy the first and the third classes, 
and the latter consists of the cities with TECs 
occupying the first and the second classes. It 
should be stressed that the second group consists 
of two greater cities only, and they both are the 
capitals of great economically developed republics 
populated with mainly Islamic people, they follow 
quite explicit ideology, and both entities are 
located in Middle Volga Region. The results of 
the elections of 2003 to State Duma with respect 
to the political behaviour issues is considered in 
(Wegren, Konitzer, 2006). Yet, it should be said 
that the up-to-date situation in Russia, both in 
political, economy and social dimensions has 
nothing to do with those conditions observed 
in 2003; thus, the observations and theories 
discussed in this paper are hardly feasible 
and current. Further analysis of these issues 
could be found in (Bowler, Hanneman, 2006). 
Mathematical modelling of voters’ behaviour is 
present in (Lo Schiavo, 2005, 2006). The models 
studied in these papers may bring some more 
understanding of the peculiarities of electoral 
behaviour, especially under the implementation 
of fine non-linear techniques of statistical analysis 
of data records. Finally, more narrative model of 
electoral behaviour is discussed by W. Claggett 
and P.H. Pollock III (2006).
In conclusion, let figure out some further 
problems and questions to be answered, when 
studying the electoral behaviour of the population 
of the Russian Federation.
Scaling problem. Do separate (but with 
abundant enough population) regions exhibit 
a similar pattern of electoral behaviour of their 
residents, as the whole country does? Definitely, 
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the answer to this question heavily depends on 
the choice of a particular region, while one may 
try to figure out typical scaling figures for several 
(typical) regions, for example, situated at the 
centers of relevant clusters or classes.
Time stability problem. What would 
happen to the structure of the clusters and/or 
classes, if one traces the dynamics of electoral 
behaviour through a series of elections? It is a 
common place, that the countries with a long 
electoral history exhibit rather sTable patterns 
of electoral behaviour. Probably, Russia has too 
short and too perturbed latest political history, so 
no reasonable stability could be expected. Indeed, 
the list of parties taking part in elections changes 
significantly each electoral cycle.
Spatial inhomogeneity problem. Russia, 
again, is a huge country with extremely 
inhomogeneous population spatial distribution. 
It results in a strong diversity of TECs from the 
point of view of the voters’ presence registered 
within the site. Federal Law requests to keep the 
difference in the abundance of voters in different 
TECs below 10 %, while there is no way to 
follow the Law. Thus, one should “purify” the 
original database eliminating some TECs which 
fall significantly beyond an average figure of 
registered voters.
Finally, it is necessary to carry out a 
comparative study of this style, to compare 
Russia and some other countries with electoral 
and political systems resembling the Russian one.
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Об электоральном поведении  
избирателей России
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В статье представлены предварительные результаты по изучению стратификации 
избирателей России по признакам электорального поведения. Кластеры были определены с 
помощью метода динамических ядер и упругих карт. Также обсуждены некоторые факторы, 
влияющие на электоральное поведение избирателей.
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